The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench has determined that the Alberta Human Rights Act applies to condominiums

I have written on the topic of the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5 before at:

http://albertacondominiumreporter.blogspot.ca/2013/05/condominium-complexes-are-private.html

Based on the recent decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in Condominium Corporation No 052 0580 v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) (the "Goldsack case") the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench has determined that the Alberta Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to hear human rights complaints. 

My original blog was partly in response to a blog by Jenifer Koshan of the University of Calgary.  Ms. Koshan has blogged in response to the Goldsack decision and I thank her for her collegiality.  I will not exhaustively respond to the further comments of Ms. Koshan.  However, I can comment that the reasoning in the University of British Columbia v. Berg case is worthy of further study.

The Berg case was the core basis upon which the Court of Queen's Bench made its determination in the Goldsack case. I contemplate going forward that the tests identified in Berg may have application to complaints made to the Human Rights Commission in Alberta.  In this respect, and without limitation, whether the alleged accommodation, service or facility subject of a complaint satisfies the relational test.  I quote from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Berg in this regard:

"This reasoning is directly applicable to any selection process used by the School in this case.  Eligibility criteria, as long as they are non-discriminatory, are a necessary part of most services, in that they ensure that the service reaches only its intended beneficiaries, its "public", thereby avoiding overuse and unnecessary depletion of scarce resources.  The benefits of such screening tools, however, should not come at the cost of excluding the protection of human rights legislation.

This is not to say that all of the activities of an accommodation, service or facility provider are necessarily subject to scrutiny under the Act just because some are.  But a quantitative approach still does not help to define what smaller segment of the entire population might suffice.  As long as the debate remains centred on the number of people who can use the service or facility, it will be very difficult to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion on a principled basis because of the varied nature of the services and facilities and service and facility providers which will fall to be considered.

Instead, in determining which activities of the School are covered by the Act, one must take a principled approach which looks to the relationship created between the service or facility provider and the service or facility user by the particular service or facility.  Some services or facilities will create public relationships between the School's representatives and its students, while other services or facilities may establish only private relationships between the same individuals."

...

"The idea of defining a "client group" for a particular service or facility focuses the inquiry on the appropriate factors of the nature of the accommodation, service or facility and the relationship it establishes between the accommodation, service or facility provider and the accommodation, service or facility user, and avoids the anomalous results of a purely numerical approach to the definition of the public.  Under the relational approach, the "public" may turn out to contain a very large or very small number of people.

 For example, Canada or Quebec Pension Plan benefits are provided to millions of Canadians, yet not to the equally large number of Canadians who have not yet attained the qualifying age.  Can it be said that the provision of such benefits should not be free from discrimination because of the established eligibility criteria which ensure that such benefits reach only those who have paid into the fund and are intended to receive them?  Or consider a privately-owned centre which publicly advertises its services or facilities to treat a rare disease, from which only two or three people in Canada suffer.  Statistically speaking, 99.99 percent of the population cannot use this service or facility, since they do not suffer from the disease and are not part of its "public".  Yet could the legislature have intended that the institution could purport to serve the public, then extend its services or make its facilities available only to male applicants?"

The relational test may be applied in some circumstances to suggest that the accommodation, service or facility provided by a condominium corporation and subject of a complaint may not have a public.  The following words from the dissenting opinion from the Berg case express this sentiment and the concern with the decision of the majority in Berg:

"While I agree that human rights legislation should, where possible, be given a broad and purposive interpretation, that interpretation has to be realistic.  If s. 3 of the British Columbia Human Rights Act is given the reach sought in these appeals there would be, in effect, no services that would not fall within the scope of "services customarily available to the public"."

Notwithstanding this minority decision, the Berg decision has been referred to in almost 300 decisions.  As an example of the types of decisions which will have to be made a search of CanLii lead me to the 1996 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers.  The Court considered the Berg decision and concluded that the services provided by the Yukon Order of Pioneers were outside of the ambit of the subject Human Rights legislation. I think this may be a portent of the type of analysis which may have to be made by the Courts in Alberta  as a consequence of the Goldsack decision.  

 

Miller Thomson Condominium Law -  Senior Living in Condominiums: 7 Things that Condo Corporations Need to Know Right Now - by Karen Phung, Toronto

The article above which is repeated below was published by Ms. Phung in July of 2014.   Ms. Phung's comments are very insightful and fore warn of the possible difficulties which may arise in Ontario in respect of the aged and as a consequence of the imposition of Ontario's human rights legislation.  A review of Alberta law continues to reflect that human rights legislation does not apply to condominium corporations.  Notwithstanding this Alberta's Human Rights Commission continues to assert that it does and this article sheds light on the need for a proactive approach to what could become a pressing issue.  I have repeated the article in full and linked to the article above.  Thanks to Ms. Phung.  


It is no secret that Canada’s population is aging.

We have all heard the news that more and more baby-boomers (born between 1946 and 1965) are retiring, or will be retiring, in the coming years. Right now, one in seven Canadians are over the age of 65. In 20 years, that number will increase to one in four. We also know that dementia, one of the most widespread mental health illnesses affecting this generation, is also on the rise. But what impact, if any, do these issues have on condominium corporations?

Here are 7 things condominium corporations need to know about Canada’s aging population, and how seniors are impacting the condominium landscape:

(1)   The number of seniors living in condominium buildings will increase

It is common for seniors to downsize their homes after they retire. The kids have moved out, there is more time to travel, and there is no longer a need (or a desire) to own and maintain a house.

Living in a condominium building is appealing to seniors because they come with fewer responsibilities and greater convenience. Seniors can rely on others for maintenance, repair and security services. Access to amenities is faster and more convenient. Limiting one’s living space to a single floor and accessing an elevator makes it easier for those with sight, strength or balance problems to reduce their risk of injury. Condominium corporations can therefore expect a growing number of seniors purchasing units with a view to enjoying these benefits. This also means that the number of condominium owners suffering from age-related mental health illnesses will also increase.

(2)   Seniors are living longer and more independent lives, which may translate to greater issues for condominiums

Not only is Canada’s population aging, but seniors are also living longer and more independently (i.e., preferring to live on their own rather than with family members or in a care facility). Furthermore, a number of seniors have no children or other family members to care for them in their later years.

A desire for independence, combined with an inevitable decline in physical and cognitive functioning, may translate into greater problems for condominium corporations including access issues (i.e., to one’s own unit and amenities), the undesirable use of the common elements (such as monopolizing or loitering), unhealthy dependency on property managers, and illness and/or abandonment. Condominium corporations need to be mindful of the kinds of issues that may arise when dealing with live-alone unit owners with age-related challenges.

(3)   Condominiums have a duty to accommodate physical impairments and mental illnesses to the point of undue hardship

Physical impairments and mental illnesses (including dementia), constitute disabilities under section 10 of theOntario Human Rights Code. Condominium corporations therefore have a legal obligation to accommodate these disabilities to the point of “undue hardship”. What constitutes “undue hardship” will depend on the individual facts and circumstances of each case.  

Those belonging to the baby-boomer generation are known for their strong views of how they expect to live their lives after retirement. Their expectations about independence will bring increased demands on condominium corporations to respond to accommodation requests so that they may maintain a certain lifestyle and level of freedom.

Corporations may have to allow certain changes to be made to an individual unit, or to modify the common elements to accommodate a unit owner’s disability. This may include installing accessibility ramps or sound-proofing rooms. In all cases, however, it means that Corporations must respond to all accommodation requests in a meaningful and timely manner. Who pays for these accommodations may not always be easily ascertainable.

(4)   Seniors with dementia and other mental illnesses may impact the way condominiums deal with compliance matters

Dementia may not only impact a person’s memory and cognitive functioning, but it may also impair his or her day-to-day behaviour and conduct in the community. A unit owner who suffers from dementia may wander into another owner’s unit without realizing it. He or she may cause noise, demonstrate aggressive or disruptive behaviours, and may also exhibit other inappropriate conduct such as hoarding.

However, enforcing compliance with the Act and the condominium’s governing documents as against a person suffering from an age-related mental health illness is not as straightforward as enforcing against the habitual smoker or the music blaster from down the hall. There are laws that protect individuals with disabilities (in particular, the Human Rights Code), which may mean that strict enforcement may not be possible (or legal) in all situations. Although there is no one-size-fits-all solution to accommodation issues, condominiums must ensure they are meeting their obligations to avoid human rights complaints.

(5)   Condominiums need to establish who is responsible for paying for the accommodation

Condominium corporations will have to determine who is responsible for paying the bill for alterations or modifications that result from accommodation requests. Does the corporation pay the bill out of its operating or reserve fund, or can the amount be charged back to the unit in the same manner as common expenses? Under what circumstances should the corporation levy a special assessment?

Whether a condominium corporation can charge back the cost incurred for accommodation is determined on a case-by-case basis and largely depends on the nature of the request and what the condominium documents provide. Typically, if accommodation is made to a resident’s own unit and is for his or her exclusive use, it will be the unit owner’s responsibility to pay. If the accommodation requires a change to a non-exclusive use common element, such as installing a front entrance ramp, the corporation may have to foot the bill.

(6)   Condominiums need to be proactive, not reactive

Condominiums should adopt a proactive rather than reactive approach to these impending issues. Below are some things that condominium corporations should be doing right now:

• Establish and implement appropriate policies and procedures for dealing with residents who have age-related disabilities that may need accommodation

These policies should include protocols for information-gathering, submitting accommodation requests, responding to accommodation requests, obtaining consents, and involving third party professionals where necessary. The corporation’s lawyer should be consulted about the best way to draft and implement these policies, keeping in mind that these policies may change over time.

• Encourage early disclosure of health-related needs and requests for accommodation

The Corporation could create a standard form for recording this information. Senior residents should also be required to provide management with up-to-date contacts in the event of an emergency and in case consent is needed. This way, the corporation will be in a better position to anticipate problems and respond accordingly. This information could be included in the Owner’s and Tenant’s Information forms, in those buildings which use them.

• Know your resources

There should be a protocol in place for contacting the appropriate family member, third party medical professional, or the police. There are a number of resources available to condominium corporations and their residents (including Community Care Access Centers, Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams, and Geriatric Mental Health Services). Condominiums should also take steps to familiarize themselves, senior unit owners and their families of these community resources in cases of emergency or non-emergency.

• Encourage small changes that will have a big impact on resident safety

Making small changes to a senior resident’s unit may have great impacts on their safety and day-to-day living. Some examples include installing safety rails in the shower, applying non-slip mats in the tub, and using fire-safe appliances with automatic shut off features.

• Document everything

Corporations need to implement a protocol for maintaining a detailed and consistent record of all accommodation requests and the Corporation’s response to those requests. Such a record will be important to demonstrate the Corporation’s efforts to comply with its legal obligations.

(7) The time to prepare is now

Condominium corporations should not wait to establish and implement the appropriate policies and procedures for dealing with these issues. As we move into a time where the demands on condominium corporations is becoming greater than ever before, condominiums should be prepared to deal with these issues head on, and with the confidence that the right systems have been put in place.

Condominium Complexes are Private; a Defense Against the creeping expansion of the Alberta Human Rights Commission

The distinction in law between "public" and "private" is a dynamic thing.  It is among many other legal concepts open to interpretation and some would say manipulation.  Where the line is drawn is significant for many reasons least of all the extent to which government can impose itself on the ordinary and private lives of our country's denizens.

Even if one does not critique the history and political philosophy of human rights legislation the incessant expansion of Human Rights Commissions in Canada is worthy of comment.  Particularly in this regard, it is important for those in condominium communities in Alberta to recognize that the Alberta Human Rights Commission (the "Commission") and many who support the shrinking of any societal space considered historically to be "private" hold the view that condominium corporations are bound by the Alberta Human Rights Act (the "AHRA").  The position articulated by the Commission is, notwithstanding the absence of any Court of Queen's Bench authority which supports the Commission's position, that section 4 of the AHRA applies to condominium corporations and prohibits discrimination against any person or class of person in respect of "accommodation or facilities" that are "customarily available to the public".

This position of the Commission is without support in law in Alberta; in this regard reference should be made to Condominium Plan No. 931 0520 v. Smith and the more recent Condominium Plan No. 9910225 v. Davis, both Court of Queen's Bench decisions.  Notwithstanding this clear enunciation of the law, an academic lawyer at the University of Calgary, Jennifer Koshan, has recently suggested that these decisions are wrongly decided.  The basis upon which Ms Koshan asserts this position is imaginative but is unfortunately illogical and lacks grounding in reality.  Ms Koshan's argument is based on a 1993 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (the "SCC") in University of British Columbia v. Berg.  
Without wallowing in the details, the facts in Berg dealt with the failure of a student to receive a rating sheet and key from the University.  The SCC indicated that the focus of their legal inquiry at pages 373-74 would be in respect of the scope of the terms  "accommodations, services or facilities" and "public" (my emphasis):

"The courts below assumed, and the School conceded, that the key and rating sheet were "services" within the meaning of the Act.  The real issue between the parties was whether such services were, on the correct interpretation of s. 3 and the evidence, customarily available to the public.  This in turn entails two inquiries:  first, whether the student body of a university (or a faculty within the university) is the "public", and if so, second, whether the services in this case were, as a matter of law and fact, customarily available to that public."

The SCC concluded that the term public means more than its ordinary meaning.  The unusual conclusion made by the SCC in Berg is found at page 383:

"Therefore, I would reject any definition of "public" which refuses to recognize that any accommodation, service or facility will only ever be available to a subset of the public.  Students admitted to a university or school within the university, or people who enter into contracts of insurance with a public insurer, or people who open accounts with financial institutions, become the "public" for that service.  Every service has its own public, and once that "public" has been defined through the use of eligibility criteria, the Act prohibits discrimination within that public."

The idead of "a public" (rather than "the public") within a "private" setting and the application of the principal of "eligibility criteria" in this regard may make sense in context of large institutions like universities, insurance companies and financial institutions frequented by many persons in society.  However, this principal of "a public" and the application of "eligibility criteria" cannot be applied to all circumstances; curiously the SCC was silent on the issue of limitation.  Moreover, and I suggest critical in this regard, the SCC's conclusion and Ms. Koshan's reliance on this conclusion from the Berg decision overlooks the limitations based on ordinary meaning which had been determined by the SCC in respect of the scope of these same terms in the Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun decision.    With all due respect, this earlier decision does not strain the ordinary meaning of these terms.  It is worthy to note that this case was referred to by the SCC in the Berg decision; the SCC quoted from the Gay Alliance case at page 374:

"After briefly discussing the nature of freedom of the press in Canada, Martland J. wrote (at pp. 454-55):

In my opinion the general purpose of s. 3 was to prevent discrimination against individuals or groups of individuals in respect of the provision of certain things available generally to the public.  The items dealt with are similar to those covered by legislation in the United States, both federal and state.  "Accommodation" refers to such matters as accommodation in hotels, inns and motels.  "Service" refers to such matters as restaurants, bars, taverns, service stations, public transportation and public utilities.  "Facility" refers to such matters as public parks and recreational facilities.  These are all items "customarily available to the public".  It is matters such as these which have been dealt with in American case law on the subject of civil rights."

The SCC had also earlier in the decision at page 366 made reference to an important comment in the decision of the Honourable Justice Legg of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and which was subject of the Appeal to the SCC (my emphasis):

"Legg J.A. assumed, in his decision for the court, that the provision of a rating sheet or a key to the building was an "accommodation, service or facility", noting that the word "service" was to be interpreted broadly, he did not agree that it constituted a service "customarily available to the public" within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act.  In reaching that conclusion, he referred to decisions of this Court stating that human rights legislation should be interpreted so as to advance the broad policy consideration underlying it, but he also argued that this did not mean that the ordinary meaning of words should be strained."

I suggest, with all due respect, that the decision of the SCC does "strain" the ordinary meaning of these terms.  Ms. Koshan is now attempting to suggest that the AHRA should apply to a private condominium communities based on the unusual principal of "eligibility criteria".  Universities are facilities created by statute and funded partly via public funds.  All students with sufficiently high grades and the financial wherewithal may attend at a university.  Perhaps in this context the determination of the SCC that the failure to provide a rating form and a key was discriminatory.  However, condominium corporations are created by registration of a Plan of Subdivision at the Land Titles Office and are simply a means of dividing a parcel of land into smaller parcels all which are capable of being owned privately.  There is nothing public about a condominium corporation.  Only invitees are permitted to come onto either the common property or any particular unit.  It embraces incredulity to suggest that a condominium corporation in this regard is anything remotely like a university or in any manner is public.  Moreover, a condominium corporation does not provide services nor accommodation or facilities.

Those who support the shrinking of societal spaces historically considered to be "private" will suggest that the availability for sale of a condominium units in a particular condominium project is the "eligibility criteria" and upon units being purchased the owners in a condominium become the "public" which the AHRA would apply to.  This is nonsense and illogical.  This faulty logic is revealed by applying the "eligibility criteria" to single detached residences on individual lots.  It is nonsensical to suggest that once an owner purchases a single detached residence they now belong to the "public".  Moving across the continuum it is also nonsensical to apply this to bare land condominiums with single detached residences on it.  It is equally as nonsensical to apply the principal of "eligibility criteria" to duplexes and townhouses not part of condominium projects; by extension this should also make it nonsensical to duplexes and townhouses in condominium complexes.  Though novel and imaginative the application of the principal of "eligibility criteria" to condominiums fails by reductio ad absurdum.   Regardless of the unusual and in some ways illogical conclusion of the SCC in Berg it is suggested that the AHRA will continue to not apply to condominium corporations in Alberta.